Abstract: With almost $1 billion in funding, Better Place was poised to become one of the most 10 innovative companies in the electric mobility market. The system Better Place proposed had two novel 11 prongs; first, to reduce the cost of batteries, and second, to reduce range anxiety, public infrastructure 12 concerns, and long charging times. Yet, despite this seemingly strong combination, Better Place failed to 13 make any progress in Denmark and Israel, the first two markets it operated in, and subsequently 14 declared bankruptcy, selling off its collective assets for less than $500,000. Drawing from science and 15 te h olog studies a d the otio of i te p eti e fle i ilit , this paper posits several reasons to 16 explain the failu e of Bette Pla e, i ludi g that De a k is ot as g ee as it see s nor is the Israeli 17 market as attractive as believed, a d that Bette Pla e's solutio to ha gi g ti e and range anxiety 18 resolved a psychological, not a functional, barrier of the general public to adopt electric vehicles. Before 19 investigating these two reasons, the paper presents a short history of Better Place and explores the 20 o tou s of its ope atio s i De a k a d Is ael. It the dis usses h Bette Pla e failed a oss both 21 countries before concluding with implications for energy planning, policy, and analysis. 22 2
Introduction 1
Electric vehicles have the potential to provide society with many substantial benefits, including 2 reduction of carbon emissions, improvement of public health, increasing national security, and savings 3 on fuel and maintenance cost (Neubauer et al., 2012; Tran et al., 2012) . Despite these benefits, electric 4
vehicles have yet to be adopted on a large scale (IEA, 2013a) (IEA, 2015) . Specifically in Denmark and 5 Israel, electric vehicle adoption did not historically move beyond a very niche level. While Denmark has 6 had a recent increase in EV sales, total alternative fueled vehicle registration in 2014 was stagnant at 7 about only 3,000, only representing 0.1% of all vehicles in use in Denmark (ANFAC, 2015) . Likewise, 8 Israel currently has 1,088 electric vehicles, comprising 0.04% of total private registered vehicles (Central 9
Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Several extant barriers to electric vehicles in the late 2000s encountered 10 include higher capital cost, range anxiety, lack of public infrastructure, and long charging time ( Seeking to erode these barriers, with almost $1 billion in funding Better Place proposed a novel 13 system to differentiate the purchase of an electric vehicle with recharging the battery (Chafkin, 2014) . 14 The system Better Place proposed, launched in 2007, had two novel prongs; first, to reduce the cost of 15 the battery, Better Place would own the battery in the electric vehicle, and consumers would instead 16 pay for an annual mileage pla u h like a ell phone data plan), and second, to reduce range 17 anxiety, public infrastructure concerns, and long charging time, Better Place constructed a network of 18 chargers and battery swapping terminals for their consumers to recharge or switch their batteries. 19
These two prongs would reduce initial capital costs, create a network of public chargers, and with 20 battery-swapping, reduce charging time to as little as 2 minutes (Naor et al., 2015) . As one magazine 21 a ti le put it, Better Place was born to be revolutionary, the epitome of the kind of world-changing 22 ambition that routinely gets celebrated (Chafkin, 2014) . 23 Place. We searched key academic databases such as Scopus, ScienceDirect, and EBSCO-Host for articles 1 published in the last ten years (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . During these searches, we looked for articles relating to (a) 2 the social acceptance of electric vehicles, (b) business models for electric mobility, and (c) case studies 3 of Better Place, of which there were only a handful) We compiled a few dozen studies though we 4 reference only the most relevant ones here. 5
To help filter this voluminous amou t of data, e elied o the o ept of i te p eti e fle i ilit 6 from science and technology studies. This literature argues the evolutionary pathway of a novel 7 technology, such as an electric vehicle or a more refined business approach such as better Place, is not 8 only a function of its technical qualities and characteristics, but equally so of its perception within society. 9
In this context, interpretative flexibility is of great importance as it holds that technology emerges in 10 so iet as a sea less e (Hughes, 1986 ) o a so iote h i al i oglio (Latour, 1999) . This concept 11 of interpretive flexibility emphasizes the mutually constitutive nature of technology, which suggests that 12 differing interpretations of the same technological device are possible. That is, different social groups see 13 pa ti ula te h ologies i diffe e t a s. These te h ologies, the , e o e hete oge eous e ause 14 their meaning, rather than being fixed, is interpreted and negotiated by those social groups connected to 15 it (Sovacool, 2011). Pinch and Bijker distinguish that technological artifacts possess interpretive flexibility 16 at two levels: first, in how different social groups conceive of technology; second, that there is no one 17 possible way that technologies are designed (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) . Artifacts are always the product of 18 inter-group negotiation, and as we will see throughout the article, such negotiation does not always bode 19 well for the future market acceptance of a technology. 20
History of Better Place 21
Better Place was founded by entrepreneur Shai Agassi in 2007 with the aim to imagine a society 22 that was no longer reliant on fossil fuels. Better Place imagined that the two barriers to the adoption of 23 electric vehicles, and thus the barriers to removing oil from society, were the higher prices of electric 1 vehicles and the problems associated with recharging the battery. While electric vehicles had higher 2 capital costs, lower fuel and maintenance cost made them cost competitive with gasoline vehicles over 3 time. Looking to capitalize on longer term economic benefits, Better Place formulated a way to reduce 4 initial capital costs by monetizing the battery, and recharging thereof, as a service to which customers 5 would subscribe. While Better Place would retain the ownership of the battery, its main value was 6 p o idi g e e g fo o su e 's atte ies, eithe th ough its ha gi g et o k o its atte s appi g 7 stations (Wolfson et al., 2011) . 8
Better Place originally focused on Israel, where they planned a large network of charging and 9 swapping stations to cover the entire nation by 2012. This plan included 2.5 charging spots for every car 10 on the road in Israel, starting with 500,000 charges, in total costing between $50 and $100 million 11 (Andersen et al., 2009) . At the same time, Better Place did not restrict its operations only to Israel and 12 soon expanded to Denmark, with plans to expand to Australia, China, and the United States. Better 13 Place partnered with Renault, and their joint battery swap-capable car was the Renault Fluence Z.E. 1 
In 14
Denmark, the vehicle cost $37,000, plus about $1,500 for their personal home charger (Loveday, 2011). 15
At the same time, the Fluence Z.E. sold for $35,000 In Israel (Chafkin, 2014) . On top of these costs, 16 d i e s e e offe ed a su s iptio pla that allo ed the to utilize Bette Pla e's ha gi g 17 infrastructure, based on the amount of miles driven per year, with prices ranging from $3,300 to $6,700 18 per year, or $275 to $560 per month (Loveday, 2011 Israel, something exacerbated by the additional strain that the salting of roads (in the winter) had on the 10 degradation of battery performance (Younesi, 2013) . While battery degradation is not an 11 insurmountable barrier, as EV adoption in Norway would show, these concerns may have added to the 12 perceived barriers to EV adoption in Denmark. These technical problems were coupled with structural 13 flaws in the business model -as one formal employee stated (quoted in (Chafkin, 2014) ): 14
Everything we needed to go right went wrong. Every cost on our spreadsheet wound up being 15 double, every time factor took twice as long. There was nothing normal about Better Place. 16 For instance, Better Place's battery-swapping stations, one of them shown in Figure 1 , were 17 projected to cost about $500,000 each; they ended up costing more than $2 million. In addition, there 18 Such difficulties became full-fledged crises when they seriously jeopardized the management of 22 the compan . Although "hai Agassi la elled hi self a se ial e t ep e eu , he had o di e t e pe ie e 23 with automotive manufacturing or electric mobility. Agassi also hired his little brother Tal Agassi to 1 manage the battery swapping stations components of BP, despite the fact that he had experience only 2 in accounting. I this a , BP p o ote s su u ed to a p o ess of sele ti e e e a e he e 3 they ignored or forgot historical data suggesting that BP was neither novel nor the first to propose 4 battery swapping. For instance, the Electric Vehicle Company in the United States operated a Battery 5
Exchange Station on Broadway in New York City for a fleet of electric taxis in 1900 which ran until 1912, 6
and the battery swapping itself occurred in three to four minutes via a hydraulic stabilizer (Kirsch, 2000) . 7
Furthermore, BP repeatedly misrepresented actual vehicle ownership and operating costs to users. 8
Agassi reputedly said in meetings and speeches his car would be cheaper than conventional ones or 9 even free; yet in Denmark, due to higher transportation costs and income taxes for dealerships, a BP car 10 cost close to $40,000 (excluding the cost of the battery). A fascination with the BP vision also meant 11 that BP managers did 't pa lose e ough atte tio to thei o t a ts ith supplie s hi h eated 12 more than $100 million in liabilities that started to accrue as delays and technical difficulties occurred. 13 BP lost $80 million alone with troubles over a billing system software with the firm Amdocs (Chafkin, 14 2014 ). 15
But these concerns are certainly and strongly complimented by social ones. There is a clear 16 i o g uit ith the pe eptio that Da es a e g ee a d the la k of adoptio of ele t i ehi les. 17
One explanation is that Da es a e ot as a ti el g ee as one might assume. To some, Denmark is 18 behavior to be more environmental. I deed, Da ish o su e s a e passi el g ee , i that the 12 main achievements of Denmark are largely invisible to the average Danish consumer. Given the broad 13 policy support of wind turbines, and the already high cost of electricity, the transition from coal in the 14 1990s to the current mix of CHP and wind did not require substantial behavior changes or increases in 15 energy expenditures from the average Danish consumer. Compare this to electric vehicles; though fuel 16 prices are highly taxed, the switch to electric vehicles would require substantial behavior change (e.g., 17
more planning due to limited driving range, charging overnight or at work), something the average 18
Danish consumer declined to do, despite their passi e g ee ess. 19
Compounding this issue is that Danish people view themselves as renewable energy leaders, 20 especially in Europe. I deed, a Da es a feel as if thei othe g ee a tio s, su h as pa i g a 21 premium for cleaner electricity, are compensating for their environmental impacts from their vehicles 22 (Flamm and Agrawal, 2012) . Moreover, surveys have found that Danes are more resistant to changing 23 their entrenched attitudes and behavior (Sovacool and Blyth, 2015) , and also have found waning 24 environmental attitudes in Denmark (Sovacool and Tambo, 2016) . Thus not only is Denmark is not 1 inherently more attuned to being green and adopting electric vehicles, it may be less willing to change 2 their behavior than neighboring European countries. Kilbourne et al. (2002) conducted a multinational 3 survey of energy and environmental attitudes, and concluded that Danish respondents were less 4 accepting of change, and more set in their values, than every other country studied except for the 5 United States. Payne (2013) also suggests that Danish people are also known for being stoic and less 6 emotional than other European societies, e oki g thei o t pe of defe si e pessi is a d 7 egati e polite ess ultu e. 8
In Denmark, therefore, there is no easy solution to the implementation of electric vehicles, and 9 perhaps existing incentives remain insufficient. In contrast to the stagnation of electric vehicles 10 adoption, Demark has established a successful recipe for mitigating the climate emissions from its 11 electricity grid. For example, Denmark accomplished a large scale replacement of coal and oil with CHP 12 and wind as result of several factors including; consistent, long-term government support of renewables 13 by way of taxes, R&D and subsidies; polycentric planning that included all stakeholders; and utilizing 14 learning-by-doing, bottom up focus of implementation (Lund, 2010) , (Parajuli, 2012) . In contrast, the 15 extent of Danish support of electric vehicles includes taxes on gasoline, electric vehicle registration tax 16 exemption (which expired at the end of 2015), and investment in public charging infrastructure (IEA, 17 2013b), as 
In sum, Denmark was not inherently more prone to adopt electric vehicles than any other 10 country that Better Place could have operated in, in spite of their green reputation. Sustainable 11 development of transportation systems requires both personal willingness to change behavior as well as 12 consistent government support. Absent both of these factors, market-based solutions like Better Place, 13 despite their novelty, will face an uphill challenge, in Denmark and beyond. 14
Why didn't the Israelis support Better Place? Don't they value energy security? 15
In addition to Denmark, Better Place originally operated in Israel. Israel seemed to be an 16 appropriate location to adopt electric vehicles, given its lack of domestic oil resources and its ongoing 17 and persistent geopolitical strife with neighboring oil-rich countries. Not surprisingly, Israel has been 18 recently concerned with its energy security and pushing for energy self-sufficiency in light of regional 19 hostility and mistrust (Bahgat, 2014) . In addition to the energy security benefits of electric vehicles, 20
Israel is also especially prone to the impacts of climate change as a result of its hot, dry climate and 21 growing concern of water supply (Bahgat, 2014) , (Newman, 2009 ). Thus, reduction of oil consumption-22 which leads to significant amounts of water pollution through normal operations, accidents, and 23 resulting emissions from tailpipes-would appear to have several clear benefit to Israeli society that 1 would directly incentivize the development of a self-sufficient, renewable transportation system. Thus 2 while Better Place viewed De a k as a opti al a ket to ope ate due to thei g ee ess , Is ael as 3 perceived as amenable environment due to their commitment to energy security. 4
Addi g this to Is ael's o e fo e e g se u it , Israel also has a rich history of environmental 5 awareness, with an active and large environmental community, with over a hundred active and legally 6 register environmental non-governmental organizations (Tal et al., 2013) . Ho e e , Is ael's 7 environmental community is markedly different than the rest of the Western world, as Israeli 8 environmental concern does not originate from subjective materialistic values (e.g., level of education 9 and income), but rather as a response to more of environmental hazard that poses an existential threat 10 Is ael's p io itizatio of e e g se u it , very little direct action has been taken to mitigate greenhouse 17 gas emissions. 18 Essentially, Is ael's se u itizatio of e e g stands as separate and arguably more important 19 than environmental concerns. Israel has long prioritized the security of its fuel supply, regardless of if it 20 was fossil fuel based or renewable. Because Is ael's e e g s ste is al ost e ti el dis o e ted f o 21 its eigh o i g ou t ies, it is o side ed a e e g isla d (Bahgat, 2008) , (Fischhendler, 2015) . transport. This essentially minimizes the importance of oil dependence for Israeli, at least vis-à-vis 7 electricity. Fo e a ple, the o e o e tio Is ael's e e g s ste had ith a eigh o i g ou t as 8 a natural gas pipeline with Egypt, where Israel agreed to purchase 60 billion cubic feet (bcf) per year of 9 natural gas from Egypt. However, the pipeline has been attacked a dozen times by terrorists and since 10 been suspended by Egyptian authorities (Bahgat, 2014 ), a d is u likel to o ti ue, aki g Is ael's 11 electricity grid more vulnerable (Siddig and Grethe, 2014), (Bahgat, 2014) . As such, energy policy in 12
Israel has focused largely on the electricity grid rather than transport, even though the policies set in 13 place to develop a more robust electric grid would also have developed an electric grid readily capable 14 of cheaply charging EVs (Teschner and Paavola, 2013). In 2010, the Israeli government passed a climate 15 change bill (the National GHG Emissions Reduction Act), focusing on reducing electricity consumption by 16 promoting energy efficiency, development of solar energy and the development of natural gas, but was 17 critiqued by the environmental community for failing to take a system-wide approach (such as 18 implementation of a carbon tax) (Michaels and Tal, 2015) . 19
In stark contrast, there has been little discussion or policy regarding the energy security of oil 20 and the electrification of transportation in Israel. As shown in Table 2 above, the extent of policies 21 encouraging EV adoption in Israel is largely an exemption from taxes. Likewise, because Israel largely 22 imports it oil from distant countries (Bahgat, 2008) , the fuel supply and consumption of oil continues to 23 e dis o e ted f o Is ael's p io itizatio of e e g se u it . A dis uptio of o e Is ael's oil suppliers 24 would entail switching importers and potentially increasing gasoline prices, while a disruption in natural 1 gas supply could potentially cause economically devastating blackouts (Michaels and Tal, 2
2015)(Teschner and Paavola, 2013). 3
Second, such dependence has convinced Israel to focus on natural gas as a preferred fuel source 4 for power and vehicles, cannibalizing the market potential for electric mobility. Around the same time 5
as its pipeline was getting attacked, Israel discovered one of the largest offshore natural gas deposits in 6 the world, aptly named Leviathan, estimated at a size of 16,000 trillion cubic feet (tcf), vastly 7 out eighi g Is ael's a ual use of . t f/ ea (Bahgat, 2014) . Is ael's ele t i it g id e ai s 8 (according to some) o the e ge of a isis (Teschner and Paavola, 2013), and the development of 9 domestic offshore natural gas would have substantial economic implications, increasing the welfare of 10
Israelis by $300-$400 million (Siddig and Grethe, 2014) . Thus, energy policy discussions have frequently 11 centered on the importance of developing and diversifying to natural gas, not electric mobility 12 (Fischhendler and Nathan, 2014) . Similarly, the development of solar electricity facilities in the Negev 13 Desert has likewise been discussed in the context of energy security and independence (Fischhendler, 14 2015) . 15 Third, and further hurting markets for EVs, Israel has enacted some of the most beneficial 16 policies and incentives for the development of fossil fuels, and somewhat marginalized environmental 17 concerns such as climate change (Bahgat, 2014) The average Israeli may not o e t the dots to the energy security implications and 7 environmental impacts of their transportation and oil consumption. Thus, similar to how Danes are 8 passi el g ee , e p opose that Is aelis a e passi el e e g se u e. Like De a k's p io itizatio 9 of g ee e e g , Is ael's p io itizatio of e e g se u it has la gel ee do e ithout the a ti e 10 participation of Israeli citizens -rather it has been done at a national scale. While natural gas and solar 11 development do not require action of average Israelis, the adoption of electric vehicles requires 12 personal investment and behavioral change. Without the support of policy or the securitization of 13 transportation (Michaels and Tal, 2015), Better Place also faced an uphill battle with the Israeli public. 14 Finally, a large portion of the Israeli vehicle fleet, especially newly purchased vehicles, are purchased by 15 employers and offered as employment benefits (Frenkel, Bendit, and Kaplan 2014). Indeed, a significant 16 subsection of the Israeli population does not pay for their car or its fuel (Bahgat, 2014) , further removing 17 the o su e f o ei g a ti el e e g se u e. Thus, the average Israeli citizen, assuming that they 18
were not provided a company car already, may not have viewed Better Place in the context of energy 19 security nor have been willing to pay for its environmental benefits. 20
In sum, Israel is indeed very concerned about energy security, however it is mostly associated 21 with developing their own supplies of fossil fuels, and little was done to actually encourage more 22 sustainable transport. While Israelis were thought to be more cognizant of environmental issues, these 23
are not defined in terms of national security (Newman, 2009) , and often take the backseat to more 24 traditionally focused energy security issues such as import dependence or security of supply. At the 1 same time, the environmental community in Israel has not made great strides in proactive climate 2 change mitigation policies, but rather focus on responding to environmental hazards -essentially 3 dealing with the symptoms, not the roots, of environmental problems (Tal et al., 2013) . While it was 4 expected that Israel would define climate change and oil consumption in terms of national security, this 5 argument never truly gained traction, and led to a lack of government support of renewable energy 6 systems (Michaels and Tal 2015), as well as indifference from the Israeli public. As a result of Israel 7 decoupling oil consumption from matters of national security, the argument for the adoption of EVs was 8 solely environmental, and still required substantial behavioral change from the average Israeli. Absent 9 consistent and substantial policy support, Better Place, despite its potential, geopolitical, energy security 10 and environmental benefits to Israel, competed in a market that was not inherently more supportive of 11 electric vehicles than any other country. 12
Why Didn't Better Place Overcome Range Anxiety? 13
The fact that Denmark and Israel may have not been special environments for electric vehicles 14 to flourish may not explain the failure of Better Place in these two countries by itself. Moreover, Better 15
Place also failed to make a substantial mark in other parts of the world, despite their seemingly solid 16 business model. From a purely electric vehicle perspective (ignoring variances in environmental 17 perspectives from country to country), this paper contends that the main barriers that Better Place 18 attempted to resolve, long charging time and range anxiety, may not be the most salient barriers to 19 electric vehicle adoption. 20
From a purely technical perspective, the range of most electric vehicles is already more than 21 sufficient for the vast majority of trips taken by personal vehicles (and it has been for many years). is roughly similar to the additional WTP for increasing the performance of the electric vehicle from 5% 16 slower than a gasoline vehicle to 5% faster (Hidrue et al., 2011) . 17
Likewise, a study in South Korea found that consumers were willing to pay $2,500 as a lump sum 18 to increase the accessibility of chargers from just ordinary locations to specialized locations, such as at 19 gas stations (Hong et al., 2012) . On an annual basis, Hong et al. (2012) noted that South Korean 20 consumers were only willing to pay $1,250 per year for the ability to swap batteries, and $751 a year to 21 be guaranteed access to chargers in all locations. Adding these numbers together, about $2,000 per 22 ea , is still sig ifi a tl less tha a of Bette Pla e's a ual su s iptio pla s, which were 50% to 23 300% more expensive than this WTP (Loveday, 2011). Therefore, while the average consumer is willing 24 to pay more to make charging more convenient and accessible, it is not clear that the creation of a quick 1 and large network of chargers and battery swapping stations would erode a major barrier to the 2 adoption of electric vehicles, nor would it be cost effective. 3
In light of the above, the question remains why range anxiety persists as a barrier to adoption of 4 electric vehicles. Some studies have found that driving range was no longer considered a problem after 5 drivers experienced electric vehicles (Ryghaug and Toftaker, 2014) , (Rauh et al., 2014) . Range anxiety 6 could be borne largely out of their ignorance of daily driving practices compared to an electric vehicle's 7 technical capabilities. At the same time, other studies found that after experiencing electric vehicles, 8 range anxiety continued to be a critical factor for drivers, in some cases increasing (Jensen et al., 2013) , 9 (Krause et al., 2013) . Thus, confusingly, range anxiety has been found to both decrease and increase 10 after an individual experiences driving of an electric vehicle. 11
Perhaps range anxiety, and the correlated need for public charging infrastructure, is not 12 dependent on the technical aspects of the electric vehicle or the charging system, but rather entirely 13 dependent on individual characteristics (Rauh et al., 2014) . Essentially, those who have characteristics 14 more attuned to driving an electric vehicle will view range anxiety is a limited barrier, whereas those 15 who reject electric vehicles will view range anxiety as a major barrier, even after driving an electric 16 vehicle. We concur with Kirsch (2000: 24-25) , who astutely noted more than a decade ago that: 17
Bla i g the atte does ot p o ide a full e pla atio … the sho tha d dete i is e pli it i 18 the blame-the-battery explanation continues to cloud present debates about the future role of 19 alternatives to internal combustion. 20
If, for instance, energy density and other salient technical properties govern technological preferences 21 alone, we would all drive uranium fueled, fission-powered cars. Thus, the solution to range anxiety may 22 not be construction of an expansive and expensive charging and battery swapping network, but rather 23 investigating the individual characteristics that determine general willingness to buy an electric vehicle. 24 Indeed, because changing behavior, expectations and attitudes regarding electric vehicles may 1 be untenable (Flamm and Agrawal, 2012) , the best solution to range anxiety may be drastically 2 increasing performance of batteries and chargers such their designs minimize alterations to lifestyle and 3 behavior in comparison to the traditional vehicle (Sovacool and Hirsh, 2009 ). Nonetheless, until that 4 point, range anxiety may continue to be a post-hoc excuse for consumers to reject electric vehicles in 5 order to avoid changing their behavior or desires. However, the structure of Better Place as a company 6 was designed specifically to reduce range anxiety and make recharging an electric vehicle more like a 7 traditional gasoline vehicle, yet still failed. Examining the failure of Better Place, as well as the existing 8 literature, this paper proposes that range anxiety may only be the surface of a much deeper, more 9 complex problem regarding identity and electric vehicles. 2012). Thus, the future of battery swapping is at a critical juncture, where it could become obsolete or 12 relegated to a niche role in the EV infrastructure system. 13
Conclusion and Policy Implications 14
In sum, Better Place presented a novel idea to reduce range anxiety and the high capital cost of 15 electric vehicles, and operated in one of the most widely-pe ei ed g ee societies in the world 16 (Denmark) alongside one where energy security is perceived to be of paramount concern (Israel). 17
Nonetheless, Better Place operated from only 2007 to 2013, failing to sell more than 400 vehicles in 18 Denmark and 900 vehicles in Israel. This paper finds that this failure can be explained by a confluence of 19 social, technical, political, and environmental factors that precipitated the demise of BP. These factors 20 cut across environmental attitudes and resistance to change among users, mismanagement and 21 strategic blunders involving corporate strategy, and higher than expected capital costs for vehicles. In 22 addition, the fa t that Da ish so iet is o l passi el greener than other societies, and because 23 electric vehicles require active changes to behavior or lifestyle, electric vehicle implementation in 1 Denmark was still an uphill challenge. In Israel, general government and citizen environmental 2 awareness did not translate to interest in electric vehicle adoption because this was not viewed as either 3 an essential energy or national security issue. These all eated a sea less e of so iote h i al 4 o st ai ts o BP's a ilit to su essfull eet its issio and promote its rather innovative business 5 model, lea i g thei ehi les a d ha gi g statio s ope to i te p eti e fle i ilit he e a 6 potential adopters simply rejected the technology. 7
Moreover, this paper supposes that range anxiety may not be a functional barrier to electric 8 vehicle adoption, and may instead be an excuse given by consumers to refrain from changing their 9 behavior, identity and desires regarding ownership of a vehicle. We must, as Kirsch has noted, reject 10 the dete i is i he e t i the la e the atte e pla atio fo failu e. Future developers of 11 electric vehicles and its systems should be cognizant of the potentially deeper connotations of range 12 a iet pe tai i g to o su e 's pe so alities a d the e ui ed go e e tal, so ietal, a d pe so al 13 support required for successful implementation of electric vehicles. 14
